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The Civil Rights Presidents: FDR to Nixon 




Presidents throughout the civil rights era had different ideas and strategies on how 
to handle the issue and bring about equality for African Americans. When evaluating the 
different presidents in the era, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Richard Nixon, it is often 
found that the main driving forces among them to act on civil rights were necessity and 
political gain. Factors such as domestic unrest, political aspirations, and political 
influence forced these presidents to act on, or delay, civil rights legislation whether they 
had the desire to or not. Although they may have found civil rights to be a moral issue 
that deserved attention, they were careful not to agitate either Southern Democrats on one 
end of the spectrum and liberals from both parties on the other end. For this reason, their 
stances on civil rights evolved to be somewhat moderate.  
 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, although not directly appealing to African 
Americans, is said to have laid the foundation for future civil rights legislation.1 
As Harvard Sitkoff put it, the New Deal provided “unprecedented substantive and 
symbolic aid to blacks,” and planted “the seeds that would later bear fruit.”2 Thanks to 
the New Deal, for the first time in American history, blacks received direct aid from 
Washington D.C. in the time of the economic crisis. In recognition of the economic 
benefits brought upon by the New Deal, a majority of blacks left the Republican Party of 
Lincoln and joined the Democratic Party when voting for the presidency.3 
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 Although the New Deal helped some blacks, that was not the goal that FDR had 
in mind. FDR relied on powerful southern congressmen to get his New Deal and much of 
what it entails reflects this fact.4 He felt as though he could not afford any confrontation 
with southerners. When the head of the NAACP, Walter White, asked for FDR’s help in 
passing an anti-lynching bill, FDR refused. It became a common theme of the Roosevelt 
administration to reject the requests of NAACP leaders and White House staff dismissed 
their attempts to meet with the president. White House staff deferred the many memos 
and informational reports from the NAACP to the Justice Department, which was not 
compassionate toward African American interests.5 
 The head of the Justice Department, Homer Cummings, was reluctant to employ 
federal statutes to protect African Americans. When members of lynch mobs in the South 
escaped state prosecution or conviction, they were never brought to trial on federal 
charges from the Justice Department. In response to the inaction on racial issues by the 
department, Walter White referred to it as the “ U.S. Department of White Justice” and 
stated that it was not concerned with crimes “involving the deprivation of life and liberty 
and citizenship to Negroes.” FDR did not make an effort to respond to the calls for action 
or complaints of African Americans and was never willing to help African Americans at 
the expense of offending Southern politicians.6 New Deal legislation itself often excluded 
blacks and met the demands of Southern Democrats. This occurred through the exclusion 
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of domestic and agricultural workers from legislation and the decentralized structure of 
many New Deal programs. At the local level, this led to blatant racial discrimination. 7 
 When FDR did appeal to blacks, it was often because he understood the growing 
importance of obtaining the black vote in future elections and in freeing the Democratic 
Party from Southern control. Much of this was due to the Great Migration of blacks 
moving from the south to the north. In the three decades preceding the 1950s, over two 
and a half million blacks migrated from the south to cities in the north.8 In 1934, for 
example, during the Democratic Convention, in an attempt to undermine conservative 
Southern democracy, delegates abolished the two-thirds voting rule at Roosevelt’s 
urging. This was done to transfer control of the convention over to Democrats from the 
North and West, and was an effort by FDR to expand the black vote in the Democratic 
Party and to gain black support for the party and the Roosevelt administration.9 
 Roosevelt began to understand that African Americans could potentially decide 
upcoming elections. Evidence found in an unsigned memo from the Roosevelt 
administration in 1940 stated that, “the Negro vote will be from 5 to 13 percent of the 
total vote cast in the November elections” in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and West Virginia. The memo then states that it “may well become the decisive factor in 
the presidential elections in most of these states.”10 
 African Americans’ main concern with Roosevelt was his failure to “speak out in 
favor of federal anti-lynching legislation and poll tax repeal bills.” His excuse to Walter 
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White for his inaction on this was that he felt too constrained by the existing institutional 
order to push for social reform.11 Clearly he felt pressure from Southern Democrats and 
was not willing to challenge their stronghold on the Party.  
 Later on, FDR would attempt to undermine the southern Democracy and remake 
the Supreme Court to be more liberal. One of Roosevelt’s greatest achievements in civil 
rights was his nomination of William Hastie to the Supreme Court who would become 
the first African American federal judge in history.12 This was part of FDR’s court-
packing plan that would appoint many people geared towards working for civil rights. 
Roosevelt’s choice in attorney general, Frank Murphy, also seemed to be a proponent for 
civil rights. Murphy established the Civil Liberties Union that would later be renamed the 
Civil Rights Section. Murphy used Sections 51 and 52 of title 18 of the Federal Criminal 
Code to make civil rights investigation an everyday function of the federal government. 
Section 51 provided criminal sections against persons conspiring to deprive any citizen of 
their constitutional rights, while Section 52 brought local government officials under 
federal jurisdiction.13 Eight of the nine men that Roosevelt appointed to the high bench of 
the Supreme Court were progressives and had the support of Walter White.14 As 
Roosevelt’s presidency advanced, he continued to challenge the existing order and tried 
to recreate the Court to fit his goals.  
 Although FDR did not pass legislation on lynching, he did publicly speak out 
against it and he expanded the FBI’s criminal jurisdiction to cover civil rights 
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investigation.15 Roosevelt’s New Deal and appointees did seem to create the foundation 
for further civil rights advances. However, for the most part, Roosevelt was reluctant to 
pass any legislation that would affect his political aspirations and often acted in the 
interest of African Americans only to increase his control of the Democratic Party. 
 Harry Truman made much more of an effort than FDR to fight for civil rights and 
it even seemed to be an issue that he was personally concerned with. Truman had been 
chosen to be Roosevelt’s vice president due to the fact that Roosevelt’s health was 
quickly deteriorating and those in the Democratic Party felt his old vice president, Henry 
Wallace, was too liberal and not fit to be president.16 The much more conservative Jimmy 
Byrnes, of South Carolina, was also being considered for the position but was considered 
a political liability, as he would have cost the administration black votes.17 For these 
reasons, it can be said that Truman was chosen because he was the most moderate choice, 
being from the border state of Missouri. 
 Truman did not waste any time in addressing the civil rights issue. Less than a 
month after becoming president, Truman met with Walter White of the NAACP. He 
made a public commitment to a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee 
(FEPC), a commitment that Roosevelt did not make while president. In October 1945, he 
nominated an African American attorney, Irvin C. Mollison, to the United States 
Customs Court.18 Truman was determined to make civil rights a top priority of his 
presidency from its beginning. 
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 For Truman, the federal government was the primary vehicle in which to address 
the nation’s civil rights issue. He called for immediate federal civil rights reform to 
guarantee the constitutional rights of all Americans and to help fight racist violence.19 He 
issued Executive Order 9808, which created a multiracial Civil Rights Committee.20 His 
insistence on using the federal government as a vehicle for civil rights reform was 
revolutionary and provided the public policy framework for the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the 1965 Voting Rights act decades later.21  
 Truman kicked of his federal civil rights program by becoming the first president 
to address the NAACP. In his speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, he also 
became the first president to commit himself and the federal government to “civil rights 
and human freedom of black Americans.”22 Although Truman appeared to understand the 
inequality and discrimination that blacks faced, it is important to point out that civil rights 
was also part of his foreign policy. He felt that the United States had to correct its civil 
rights abuses if it were to succeed as the leader of the free world following World War II. 
He was concerned about America’s global image and the influence it had on emerging 
democracies. His civil rights program seemed to fit right in with the Truman Doctrine of 
containing communism and promoting democracy across the world.23  
 When Harry Truman made a commitment to civil rights, it was not popular. Just 6 
months after his call for civil rights before the NAACP, a Gallup poll showed that 82 
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percent of the fifteen hundred adults surveyed opposed his civil rights program.24 
However, Truman was determined. After giving the speech, he told Walter White that he 
meant every word of what he said and was going to prove that he meant it, and civil 
rights became his number one priority.25 Truman deserves praise for this. He was pushing 
for civil rights at a time when it was not popular and there was not significant domestic 
unrest forcing him to act. 
 After winning the Democratic nomination for 1948 election, Truman summoned 
the members of the Eightieth Congress to a special session. Here he issued two executive 
orders that would show his commitment to civil rights.26 Executive Order 9980, 
Regulations Governing Fair Employment Practices Within the Federal Establishment, 
mandated the elimination of discriminatory practices throughout the federal government 
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The New York Times stated that through 
this order, “a little FEPC is created.” To ensure that this order would take effect Truman 
put the heads of each federal department and agency on notice by telling them he would 
hold each one of them “personally responsible for an effective program to ensure that fair 
employment policies are fully observed in all personnel actions within his department.”27 
 Truman then instructed each federal department head to designate a fair 
employment officer. This person would be given “full operating responsibility, under 
immediate supervision of the department head” and had the task of carrying out the 
detailed mandate of Executive Order 9980.28 The order also established a seven member 
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Fair Employment Board within the Civil Service Commission that was authorized to 
review employment decisions of any cabinet officer in Truman’s administration.29 It also 
helped to stop discrimination by employers and labor unions.30 This opened up many 
federal opportunities to African Americans and was one of Truman’s greatest civil rights 
achievements. Even more important, was his issuance of Executive Order 9981, which 
set into motion the integration of all the armed forces in the United States. Truman 
ordered his military leaders to immediately begin to integrate all of the service 
branches.31 This was arguably his greatest civil rights achievement. 
 Harry Truman’s strategy to use the federal government as a vehicle for civil rights 
would prove important, as he could not achieve much in terms of legislation. This was 
due to the coalition of Southern Democrats and states’ rights Republicans in Congress 
that would not tolerate legislatively mandated change.32 Because of this, Truman set out 
to end racial discrimination where the federal government had the power to do so. In 
1950, this strategy lead to the desegregation of public pools in Washington D.C.33  
 He also went on to issue more executive orders to continue his federal 
enforcement of civil rights. He issued Executive Order 10210 that created civil rights 
employment protections under the War Powers Act of 1941 and prohibited any race-
based discrimination.34 He also issued Executive Order 10308, which mandated 
nondiscrimination in the hiring practices of all vendors doing business with the federal 
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government. This insured that federal contractors could not exclude black Americans.35 It 
also helped obtain desegregation in the federal Civil Service.36 
 Truman and his appointees were also determined to overturn the Plessy v. 
Ferguson “separate but equal” doctrine.37 Truman appointee Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court Fred M. Vinson, in the case McLaurin v. Oklahoma, found the discrimination 
practices of segregating the black student G.W. McLaurin to be unconstitutional.38 In a 
similar ruling, Sweatt v. Painter, the Court ruled that not allowing Herman Sweatt to 
attend the University of Texas because he was black violated the fourteenth 
amendment.39 Truman’s appointee, Vinson, played a major role in the process of ending 
discrimination practices in colleges and universities. 
 Even though Truman made great advancements in civil rights and seemed 
personally sympathetic to the plight of African Americans, it is important to keep in mind 
his desire to improve America’s image abroad and the place of civil rights in that 
strategy. Truman treated African Americans with decency and respect and this included 
black servants at the White House who had fond memories of Truman.40 However, in 
private, Truman still used negative racial slurs and told racial jokes.41 With that said, his 
actions proved to be monumental in the cause of civil rights and it can be argued that he 
is not given enough recognition for his contribution. 
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 In contrast to Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower was reluctant to associate 
himself with civil rights or other difficult policy decisions.42 He often went to great 
lengths to distance himself from race problems and integration.43 He also held doubts 
about legislation being able to fight discrimination, stating that the law itself cannot bring 
equality.44 For this reason, he at times appeared to be sympathetic to white southerners, 
saying that it is “difficult to change a man’s heart.”45 
 Eisenhower was assuredly a moderate on the civil rights issue and willingly 
admitted to being one, saying “I believe that the true radical is the fellow who is standing 
in the middle and battling both extremes.”46 He was also a proponent of states’ rights who 
believed that the states should resolve most civil rights issues, but he did believe the 
federal government should eliminate inequalities wherever possible. He had many 
“Southern friends” that shared this view and campaigned frequently in the South.47 
 One of Eisenhower’s best contributions to the civil rights struggle was his 
appointment of civil rights advocates. Eisenhower’s attorney general, Herbert Brownell, 
was Eisenhower’s main influence for acting on civil rights. Brownell filled the Justice 
Department with other civil rights advocates including the California Republican 
Governor, Earl Warren. The administration also appointed more than two dozen African-
Americans including the secretary Lois Lippman, who was the first African American to 
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serve in the White House in a capacity other than janitor.48 Eisenhower continued this 
pattern when he appointed five justices to the Supreme Court. Despite political pressure 
from the South, none of them were southerners or segregationists.49 
 Eisenhower was committed to ending discrimination where possible and one of 
his first actions was eliminating segregation in the military district of Washington D.C. 
Adding to this, in the Thompson decision, the Supreme Court prohibited discrimination in 
the district’s eating places much to Eisenhower’s approval.50 When Harry Truman signed 
his executive order to eliminate segregation in the military, it did not set a deadline and 
was not strictly enforced. The Navy and Marine Corps refused to follow the order and the 
Air Force only implemented a limited program of compliance. Being a military general, 
Eisenhower was able to accomplish the transformation to desegregation of the armed 
forces with considerable speed through quiet negotiations with leading military officers.51 
 After enforcing desegregation in the military, Eisenhower then moved to military 
schools. Although he faced resistance, Eisenhower managed to integrate hundreds of 
classrooms.52 He then moved to desegregate Veterans Administration hospitals and on 
naval bases.53  Eisenhower used his military experience as an advantage to gain 
compliance with his desegregation efforts.  
 Perhaps Eisenhower’s greatest civil rights achievement was nominating Earl 
Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In the case of Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, Warren and the court ruled that segregation in public schools was 
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unconstitutional.54 Eisenhower’s response to the Brown decision has been open for 
criticism, as he did not state whether or not he agreed with the decision. When asked 
about Brown, he said, “the Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold the 
constitutional process in this country; and I will obey.”55 The fact that Eisenhower never 
endorsed or condemned Brown shows that he was unwilling to upset his “Southern 
friends.”  
 Eisenhower held the fear that the Brown decision would cause Southerners to 
“virtually cancel out their public education system.” Warren himself wrote in his 
memoirs that he believed Eisenhower resented the decision and that it ended their 
“cordial relations.” In the 1960s, Eisenhower frequently remarked that his biggest 
mistake was “the appointment of that dumb son of a bitch Earl Warren,” although he may 
have been referring to other decisions Warren made.56 According to Warren, at a dinner 
at the White House, Eisenhower also defended Southerners who were against the Brown 
ruling by saying that “all they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are 
not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes.”57 Whether 
Eisenhower was against the Brown decision or not, his response showed a willingness to 
work with Southerners and states rights advocates on the issue of segregation and a 
reluctance to associate himself with civil rights issues. 
 Eisenhower’s first endorsement of civil rights legislation came when he promised 
to support Brownell’s proposed civil rights legislation in 1956.58 With Eisenhower’s 
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endorsement, the bill passed through the House and the GOP platform agreed to “accept” 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.59 The Senate, with the help of Lyndon Johnson, 
would eventually vote to change the bill to contain an amendment requiring a jury trial 
for the prosecution of criminal contempt for voting rights violations, much to 
Eisenhower’s dismay who said that he did “not believe in any amendment” to the bill.60  
This was because Southern juries would never convict officials for refusing an African 
American their right to vote.61 Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard Nixon, shared 
Eisenhower’s opinion, calling the amendment “a vote against the right to vote.”62 The 
watered-down Civil Rights Act of 1957 did get passed as much weaker legislation than 
what was proposed, but without the jury trial amendment to appease Southerners, it might 
not have been passed at all.63  
 Eisenhower’s most memorable achievement for civil rights was when the 
Governor of Arkansas Orval Faubus defied the Brown ruling and federal orders by 
blocking the integration of Central High School in Little Rock.64 Faubus deployed the 
Arkansas National Guard to block the entrance of nine black students attempting to enter 
the school, which turned into violence when mobs of white people showed up to protest 
integration. Although Eisenhower did not want to send in troops, he was eventually 
forced to by the deteriorating situation. Eisenhower mobilized the 101st Airborne 
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Division and nationalized the Arkansas National Guard in order to assure the students 
were admitted into the school.65 
 Eisenhower’s last achievement for civil rights was the Civil Rights Act of 1960. 
The act provided basic protection of voting rights for African Americans, authorized the 
appointment of voting referees, and allowed for contempt of court charges to anyone who 
obstructed a qualified African American from voting.66 This was the last piece of civil 
rights legislation of Eisenhower’s presidency. Although his appointees proved to be 
significant for the cause of civil rights, Eisenhower was too reluctant to associate himself 
with the cause. His moderate position often showed reluctance to upset Southern 
Democrats and states’ rights Republicans. He did not appear to show a desire to propose 
civil rights legislation and seemed to only act on civil rights issues when it was necessary 
or to advance his political aspirations. 
 In contrast to Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy’s fight for civil rights began in the 
Senate. As a Senator, Kennedy supported the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and much like 
Eisenhower and Nixon, he was against the jury trial amendment.67 However, Kennedy 
voted for the amendment due to pressure from Southerners and to avoid jeopardizing the 
entire bill.68 It became a common theme for Kennedy to try to use both sides of the civil 
rights issue to his political advantage. 
 He would continue this strategy when he introduced an anti-bombing bill. He saw 
this as an opportunity to strengthen ties with southern leaders and gain support from 
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African Americans. The bill would make it a federal crime to import or transport between 
states any explosives that were to be used unlawfully. By restricting its reach to 
bombings carried out with explosives transported over state lines, the bill simultaneously 
managed to support civil rights and states’ rights.69 This bill appealed to both Southerners 
and Northerners and was later incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1960.70 
 Kennedy moved away from this strategy when he was campaigning for the 1960 
presidential nomination. He began to actively pursue black support and attempt to woo 
blacks that were skeptical of him. He also took up the opportunity to chair the newly 
created Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs and called on 
America to adopt a “strong Africa policy.”71 Kennedy planned to campaign in the North 
and West and planned only a few detours in the South. He thought it would be wise to 
distance himself from segregationists since he was certain the South would support 
Lyndon Johnson and he did not want any support from the South to affect his North-
centered campaign.72 Kennedy saw gaining black support to be crucial to his campaign. 
For this reason, Kennedy decided to run as a liberal Democrat.73 
 In a speech given in Milwaukee, Kennedy outlined a strong stance on civil rights 
that included a new four-point plan. This plan included stressing the right of every citizen 
to vote in all elections, calling for the attorney general to be granted powers to protect the 
right to vote, calling for the enactment of his anti-bombing legislation, and the fourth 
point urged Congress to accelerate the process of school integration through legislative 
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and executive action.74 Kennedy began to distance himself from the South and in just a 
two-week period, he recast himself as a strong supporter of the civil rights struggle. How 
sincere Kennedy’s stance on civil rights was at the time is questionable. Every change in 
his stance on civil rights coincided with a twist in the fight for nomination. For example, 
when Johnson emerged as the favored candidate in the South, Kennedy and his staff 
quickly reexamined his civil rights strategy and carved out a stronger stance on the 
issue.75  
Kennedy won the Democratic nomination due to his strong civil rights stance.76 
After winning the nomination, he again began to sway in his stance on civil rights by 
appointing Lyndon Johnson to be his running mate. This caused uproar in Kennedy’s 
civil rights office, especially from Bobby Kennedy, and brought about criticism from 
liberals and blacks. Kennedy saw appointing Johnson as the only way to win support in 
the South.77 This would prove to be a smart move as Johnson’s presence on the ticket 
helped Kennedy considerably in the South.78 Kennedy, ever the opportunist, was willing 
to shift his stance on civil rights if it would help to advance his own political aspirations. 
 The appointment of Johnson seemed to parallel the modification of Kennedy’s 
approach on the issue of civil rights. Kennedy began to try to appeal to both liberals and 
southerners. Kennedy and his campaign assured liberals and blacks that they had nothing 
to fear from the appointment of Johnson, and were simultaneously trying to convince 
southerners that they had little to fear from Kennedy’s presidency. In a meeting with 
                                                        
74 Ibid, 117. 
75 Ibid, 137. 
76 Ibid, 147. 
77 Ibid, 148-149. 
78 Carl M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (New York, NY: 
Columbia University, 1977), 53. 
  
17 
Governor Ernest Vandiver of Georgia, Kennedy even promised that he would never send 
federal troops into Georgia to enforce school desegregation.79 
 In his attempt to appeal to both the North and the South, Kennedy adopted a 
strategy that often only showed symbolic support for civil rights and the advancement of 
equality for blacks. He ran an integrated campaign, formed the Civil Rights Section, and 
brought a black aide with him at all times throughout the campaign.80 Possibly the 
biggest symbolic gesture of his campaign happened when Martin Luther King Jr. was 
arrested during a sit-in protest in Atlanta.81  Kennedy realized the importance of 
supporting King in gaining support among African Americans. He called Kings wife, 
Coretta, to show his concern for her and her husband.82 This gesture became the ultimate 
symbol of Kennedy’s sympathy with the black struggle and came at no real political cost. 
83 Carl Brauer even suggests that it may have been the major factor in winning the 
election.84  
 This marked the beginning of a new civil rights strategy for Kennedy. He realized 
that a minimalist civil rights policy, with high profile appointments and grand gestures, 
would be sufficient to secure his popularity. Kennedy would never fulfill many of the 
promises he made in his campaign.85 This can be seen in the adoption of his minimal 
legislative program. His administration would seek to raise the minimum wage, help 
promote economic development in depressed areas, grant federal aid to education, 
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provide new housing, and offer medical care to the elderly. Civil rights was not on his 
list. He never had a desire to lead an assault on segregation, began to back away from 
civil rights, and much like Eisenhower, he became a gradualist.86 
 Kennedy’s first challenge on civil rights after becoming president was the battle 
over the revision to the filibuster rule in the Senate. Liberal Democrats wanted to change 
the rule so the Senate could close off debate with majority cloture of votes to end a 
filibuster.87 Kennedy refused to intervene in the struggle and the rule was not reformed. 
Had Kennedy intervened, it is likely that the rule would have been changed.88  
 Kennedy continued his strategy of distancing himself from civil rights politically 
while symbolically associating himself to the cause. For example, blacks were featured 
heavily in his inaugural celebrations but were barely mentioned in his inaugural 
address.89 He appointed numerous African Americans, including the first African 
American appointed to the secret service, although none were appointed to his cabinet.90 
Kennedy understood the symbolic importance of appointing blacks although he rarely 
met and conferred with the blacks that he appointed.91  
 In his 1960 campaign, Kennedy promised to pass a housing order that would end 
discrimination in federally assisted public housing.92 When he became president, he put 
off these plans as he distanced himself from acting on civil rights.93 Although he 
eventually did issue the housing order as Executive Order 11063, it fell short of the 
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expectations of civil rights activists.94 Kennedy made many promises in his campaign 
that he did not deliver on once he achieved his political aspirations. 
 Kennedy’s attorney general and brother Robert Kennedy was much more willing 
to act on civil rights and often urged John Kennedy to act on behalf of civil rights. When 
civil rights activists participating in the Freedom Rides protesting segregation on buses 
were met with violence in Birmingham, Alabama, Kennedy did not intervene.95 Bobby 
Kennedy on the other hand, ordered federal marshals in to protect the activists, and he 
also wanted to file suits against the police in Montgomery and Birmingham.96 Too often, 
Bobby Kennedy was left to deal with the civil rights issues that John F. Kennedy did not 
want to confront. Even before the Freedom Rides, the attorney general had become the 
moving force within the administration for a Presidential initiative on behalf of civil 
rights.97 In terms of legislation, John Kennedy would back new legislation but not 
introduce it. However he failed to fight for a voting rights bill introduced by the Justice 
Department that would put an end to literacy tests.98  
 Other issues would force Kennedy to act on civil rights. When activists in Albany, 
Georgia faced violence when protesting segregation in the city, Kennedy spoke out 
against violence towards blacks and for the first time while in office, he sided with the 
demonstrators.99 When Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett blocked the admission of 
James Meredith to the University of Mississippi, Kennedy was obligated to enforce the 
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rulings of the Supreme Court.100 Once again, Bobby Kennedy was the mediator in the 
conflict and was in regular contact with Barnett.101 Although Kennedy eventually sent in 
federal troops to secure Meredith’s admission, much like Eisenhower in Little Rock, he 
did not handle the situation well.102 Kennedy had given too much leniency to Barnett in 
attempts to address the situation without having to send in federal troops. This allowed 
the situation to escalate, which resulted in riots in which two people were murdered and 
Meredith was almost lynched.103 
  When sit-in protests in Birmingham resulted in the arrest of Martin Luther King, 
Kennedy again showed his support by calling Coretta Scott King.104 The sit-ins resulted 
in racial unrest that included the police using fire hoses and dogs to disperse the 
protestors.105 When three bombs went off in Birmingham it appeared to be an attempt to 
intimidate King and his family. This resulted in a mob of 2,500 angry blacks rampaging 
through the streets, raiding stores, wrecking police cars, and burning buildings.106 
 This Birmingham crisis began to change Kennedy’s view on civil rights and 
legislation. Bobby Kennedy was also a major influence on his brother and the idea of 
proposing new legislation was brought up.107 In response to growing violence in the civil 
rights movement, Kennedy introduced a new civil rights bill to Congress. The bill 
included measures boosting voting rights in federal elections, prohibited discrimination in 
places of public accommodation, allowed the attorney general to initiate school 
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desegregation suits, called for the establishment of a Community Relations Service, 
extended the Civil Rights Committee, and prevented discrimination in federally assisted 
programs.108 It is likely the bill would have become law before the 1964 presidential 
election but due to Kennedy’s assassination, it was put on hold.109 
 Throughout his participation in civil rights issues, Kennedy used it to his 
advantage to gain political support. After obtaining the presidency, he backtracked 
frequently on his civil rights stance. He seemed only willing to support civil rights when 
it would help him politically or when violence made it a necessity. He left many of the 
issues he faced to be dealt with by Robert Kennedy and others in his administration. It is 
easy to remember Kennedy as a champion of civil rights, but in actuality, he was a 
moderate.  
 Like Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson first began to deal with civil rights issues while 
he was in the Senate. Johnson’s views on civil rights changed drastically over the time of 
his political career. When Johnson ran for the United States Senate in 1948, he ran as a 
Southerner and therefore, he expressed Southern views and was a vocal segregationist. 
He denounced Harry Truman’s civil rights proposals and stated, “I voted against the so-
called and mis-named civil rights bills; and I expect to continue fighting them in my six 
years as a Senator.” He often used race to further his ambitions and this is the strategy he 
used to become a Senator.110 
 Even before becoming a senator, Johnson helped the cause of African Americans 
through his work as the director of National Youth Administration for Texas. When it 
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came to providing basic economic aid, Johnson crossed the color line and provided aid to 
people who needed it regardless of their skin color. However, he never appointed an 
African American to a supervisory role in the administration.111 He seemed to be 
committed to helping the poor of all races. In his first term in Congress, he managed to 
get one of the first low rent federally subsidized housing projects built in Austin in which 
sixty of the units went to black families. He also backed most of the New Deal economic 
legislation that came to the floor.112 
 As a Congressman, however, Johnson usually acted in the interest of Southern 
views. He voted against every piece of civil rights legislation that came to the floor of the 
House. This included anti-lynching proposals in 1938 and 1940; poll tax abolition bills in 
1942, 1943, and 1945; a fair employment bill in 1946; and an antidiscrimination 
amendment to the federal school lunch program in 1946. He stated views that had felt he 
had to stand with the South and if he did not, he would not be able to further his political 
ambitions.113 Johnson would not act on civil rights issues if it was a threat to his election 
or reelection to office. 
 He continued this strategy in the Senate when he used his first speech to attack a 
proposal to liberalize the filibuster rule that allowed southerners to keep civil rights 
legislation from being passed. His speech also defended the traditional view of civil 
rights but stated that when spoke out against proposals; he was not “speaking against the 
Negro race… This is not the way to accomplish what so many want to do for the Negro 
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race.”114 Here Johnson expressed the southern view on civil rights although distancing 
himself from the racist aspects of many of the southerners’ views. 
 When Johnson became the majority leader of the Senate, he had to respond to the 
mood of the Democratic Party. Johnson showed mild disapproval of the Brown decision 
but did seem to respect the Supreme Court’s ruling. Even though he did not necessarily 
agree with the ruling, he did not sign the Southern Manifesto that condemned the 
decision.115 This appears to be when Johnson began to split from segregationist southern 
views. 
 One of the main factors the led to Johnson supporting civil rights legislation was 
the desire to gain black support for the Democrats. Johnson played a key role in molding 
Eisenhower’s 1957 Civil Rights Act. He managed to exclude part of the bill that outraged 
southerners: the granting of injunctive powers to federal court judges in civil rights 
violations.116 Adding to this, he was able to add the jury trial amendment that would 
allow southern juries to be appointed to cases of the violation of voting rights. It was 
understood that no southern jury would convict a white person for blocking the voting 
rights of a black person.117 Through these actions, Johnson was able to get a bill that both 
southerners and northerners could accept. Without these changes, the bill might not have 
passed at all. However, the act did little to increase black voting and did nothing to 
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protect other civil rights.118 Also, Johnson saw protecting the rights of blacks in the South 
to be crucial to his bid for presidency in 1960.119 
 Johnson even introduced his own legislative measures. Due to the crucial role that 
civil rights would play in the 1960 presidential election, Johnson introduced the first civil 
rights bill by a southerner since Reconstruction. This proposal offered a program that 
established an independent conciliation service to mediate racial disputes in tense 
communities, extended the life of the Civil Rights Commission for two years, provided 
for federal investigation and penalties in bombing cases, and granted the attorney general 
the right to subpoena documents concerning registration.120 Johnson would also support 
and help gain support for the Civil Rights Act of 1960.121 Johnson understood the 
importance of promoting civil rights in helping his chances to win the presidential 
election in 1960. 
 When Kennedy was elected and Johnson became Vice President, he was not 
happy about it. Neither was Bobby Kennedy who would oppose anything that Johnson 
proposed. For this reason, he never had much power as Vice President.122 John Kennedy 
did not want Johnson managing the legislative program of the administration and 
appointed him to the head of the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity 
(PCEEO).123 Johnson used his position as chairman of the PCEEO to make his first 
positive contact with national black leaders. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP stated that that 
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he saw “the first real change in Johnson when he was Vice President.”124 He launched the 
Plans for Progress program to obtain voluntary compliance by government contractors to 
meet increased black employment goals. Through his efforts, federal jobs held by blacks 
increased 17 percent in 1962 and another 22 percent in 1963, and Johnson directed 
private contractors to correct nearly 1,700 complaints from black employees. However, 
his gains in the PCEEO barely made a dent in black unemployment or satisfied the 
demands for civil rights legislation.125 
 Johnson was beginning to be an articulate and vocal administrative spokesman for 
civil rights. In 1963, he delivered a Memorial Day speech at Gettysburg that was 
arguably a more expansive and passionate speech on civil rights than Kennedy had ever 
given.126 After this, Johnson was consulted more by the administration on civil rights 
issues and became an active member of the White House civil rights team.127 He would 
continue his efforts to fight for civil rights after President Kennedy’s assassination.  
 When Johnson became President, his first priority was civil rights and he 
expressed this in a televised address to Congress in which he called for passage of the 
civil rights bill that Kennedy had proposed.128 Here Johnson showed strong resilience as 
he was not willing to compromise on the bill and wanted it passed just as it was.129 He 
expressed that  “no eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory” 
than the passage of his civil rights legislation.130 He was clearly committed to the bill and 
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sought cloture to combat a filibuster, and managed to get the first successful cloture vote 
with a civil rights bill pending. 131 The bill remained strong and maintained Kennedy’s 
proposals. On July 2, 1964, Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was already 
thinking of future civil rights legislation.132 He showed a major shift in his time as 
president from his time as a senator and seemed committed to civil rights, but he was also 
concerned with winning the Presidential election of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
helped him secure the victory.133  
 Johnson still stayed committed to maintaining southern support, however. When 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) planned to send delegates to the 1964 
Democratic National Convention to challenge the credentials of the all-white Mississippi 
Democratic party delegation, Johnson wanted to keep them from disrupting the 
convention, and he saw their challenge as an ingratitude.134 When Fannie Lou Hamer 
presented MFDP’s case at the convention, Johnson called for a televised news conference 
in the middle of her testimony.135 Eventually, a compromise was made to allow the 
MFDP to seat only two delegates.136 Johnson even picked the delegates, which angered 
the MFDP. Johnson was worried he would lose Southern support if he allowed the party 
to be seated at the convention.137 He showed his limitations and that he was not willing to 
fight for civil rights if it would cost him support in the South. 
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 Understanding the importance of black support in the future of the Democratic 
Party and in offsetting white southerners’ control of the party, Johnson and his staff 
decided to write up a voting rights bill.138 When violence from state troopers met 
nonviolent protestors in Selma, Alabama, the administration accelerated efforts to draft a 
bill. Johnson told Attorney General Katzenbach to “write the goddamndest, toughest 
voting rights bill that you can devise.”139 In a televised joint legislation of Congress, 
Johnson introduced the new legislation. The bill would strike down restrictions denying 
blacks the right to vote, establish a standard for registration, send federal officials 
empowered to register blacks wherever state officials refused to register them, and ensure 
that properly registered individuals are not prohibited from voting.140 It became the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.141 Johnson would later say that this was his greatest 
accomplishment.142 
 Another aspect of Johnson’s efforts towards advancing civil rights was his War on 
Poverty. He asked Congress for bold proposals including “the most far-reaching tax-cut 
of our time,” the most effective and efficient foreign aid program ever, and building more 
homes, schools, libraries, and hospitals than any single session of Congress in history.143 
Due to the Vietnam War, Johnson’s War on Poverty programs diminished. Adding to 
this, urban race riots broke out in thirty-eight cities in 1966 that substantially stalled his 
civil rights measures for the remainder of his presidency as race riots continued into 
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1967.144 Johnson was more concerned with avoiding a race war between blacks and 
whites and sought to find ways to bring about more peaceful change.145 He tried to 
sustain black gains through the courts that would require the least amount of government 
spending, and he tried to keep all political costs to a minimum.146 One of Johnson’s last 
successes in civil rights was helping the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968.147 
 Although Lyndon Johnson made great strides in obtaining civil rights, he often 
did so to achieve his own political aspirations. He did not want to upset his supporters in 
the South and avoided doing so whenever possible. Johnson used his support of civil 
rights to gain black support for himself and the Democratic Party in general. 
 Richard Nixon was much more conservative on civil rights than Johnson. 
Although he enthusiastically endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and the Voting Rights 
act of 1965, he was much more reluctant to pass legislation when president.148 Nixon had 
many interests in the South, courted white southerners, and made little effort to gain 
African American votes.149 He also believed in improving the equality of blacks through 
promoting their financial interests and securing jobs for them, not through welfare 
programs.150 
In the issue of desegregation, Nixon wanted to enforce the law to attack de jure 
segregation but not de facto segregation. He hoped to separate desegregation and 
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integration and opposed the busing of students to different school districts to achieve 
integration. He believed that children, regardless of their race, should attend the school 
nearest to their homes.151 Nixon stated his beliefs that busing a child into a strange 
community would “destroy that child.”152 Just as he believed that segregation was wrong, 
he believed that forced integration was just as wrong.153 He left the means to fight bias to 
litigation in desegregation and in fair housing, sought gradual, voluntary integration and 
stepped up the Justice Department’s prosecution of housing bias.154  Clearly Nixon was 
not willing to tackle desegregation and discrimination in housing head on. 
 One of Nixon’s civil rights achievements was the signing of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1970. This act extended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for five more years and 
ended the use of literacy tests in registering to vote.155 Nixon knew that vetoing this act 
would further divide the country and he wanted to prevent the “goddamn country” from 
“blowing up.”156 He seemed only willing to pass legislation when it was necessary to 
prevent violence or disorder in the country. 
 Above all strategies, Nixon believed in affirmative action and increasing 
economic opportunities for African Americans as the best way for them to gain 
equality.157 Nixon called for greater enforcement of fair employment and was committed 
to opening construction unions to minorities.158 He also ordered the Civil Service 
Commission to review the government’s hiring practices. That led to Executive Order 
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11478, which urged federal offices to take “positive action” to eliminate bias. Nixon also 
signed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 that permitted individuals to sue 
universities suspected of bias.159  
 Nixon pursued the strategy of “black capitalism” by increasing employment 
opportunities for blacks. He established the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, 
expanded federal procurement from firms owned by African Americans, and laid the 
basis for contract set-asides from minority-owned firms.160 He also proposed tax 
incentives to corporations investing in depressed neighborhoods, expansion of tutorial 
assistance and job training, and government loans to black entrepreneurs and 
homeowners.161 He signed Executive Order 11458 that founded the Office of Minority 
Business Enterprise within the Commerce Department. In pursuing this strategy and 
ignoring other civil rights matters, Nixon underestimated the complexity of African 
American social and economic concerns and ignored the fact that discrimination in home 
sales and wage scales helped keep African American in urban ghettos.162 In this way, 
Nixon’s strategies were not enough address all of the civil rights issues. 
 Nixon continued his strategy of black capitalism when he increased federal 
deposits in minority owned banks.163 Nixon significantly expanded federal aid to black 
colleges. Subsidies to black colleges increased from $108 million in 1969 to $167 million 
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in 1971.164 Nixon was reluctant to pass legislation attacking issues on civil rights that did 
not have to do with their higher education, housing, or economic opportunity.  
 Nixon’s relationship with civil rights leaders was not a good one and he 
sometimes seemed upset that he had to handle the civil rights issue at all. After a 
confrontation with Ralph Abernathy of the SCLC, Nixon stated that he was becoming 
“pretty fed up with blacks and their hopeless attitude.” He was becoming convinced that 
civil rights activists preferred confrontation to compromise.165 There was also Nixon’s 
belief in “benign neglect” on the civil rights issue. This was the idea that the issue could 
use a period in which it is not acted on, black progress continued from what has already 
been achieved, and racial rhetoric faded. This belief caused much controversy and 
criticism from African Americans of Nixon and his administration.166  
 Ironically, more school desegregation happened under Nixon than any other 
president.167 This was not Nixon’s doing, however, and he even disagreed with the 
decision that provided for this, Alexander v. Holmes County, which ruled that every 
school district had to terminate segregated schools immediately.168 Nixon used federal 
power to integrate the workplace, but not in neighborhoods or public schools due to his 
anti-busing and ignorance of discrimination.169 Without pressure from the federal 
government, suburban integration faded and by the 1990s, it was not even on the national 
agenda. Without busing, blacks and whites remained isolated and Nixon allowed de facto 
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segregation to continue to exist.170 His administration was marked by public disputes 
over busing and Supreme Court nominations that seemed to increase racial 
polarization.171 
 Nixon seemed to retreat from the presidents before him that pushed for civil 
rights. Nixon seemed reluctant to push the issue and was never willing to sacrifice his 
southern support to help African Americans. Much like the other civil rights presidents, 
he seemed to only push for civil rights when it was necessary or when it could gain 
support for himself, and ultimately was a moderate on the issue of civil rights. 
 It seems as though Harry Truman deserves more praise then the other presidents 
that have been explored because he acted on an issue that at the time was rather 
unpopular and did not appear worried about the consequences. However, he did 
understand the importance of obtaining the black vote and how civil rights affected 
America’s image abroad. Having said that, it can be understood that each one of these 
presidents acted on civil rights out of necessity, out of influence from political pressure, 
or to further their political aspirations. It seems that the classical view of Kennedy and 
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